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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
enforced by the courts. It would bar the plaintiff's access to res
ipsa loquitur until he can produce some affirmative evidence. This
is m opposition to the present day doctrine which allows the plain-
tiff to use res ipsa loquitur when he cannot show the negligence
of the defendant. By requiring this additional evidence, the courts
can insure a better application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
RONALD D. MARKOVITS
PRODUCTS LIABILITY-BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY-MANUFAC-
TURERS' LIABILITY TO ULTIMATE CONSUMERS-A seven week old
child, living next door, used a vaporizer-humidifier purchased by
his aunt for the ordinary purpose of relieving nasal congestion.
The humidifier shot boiling water upon the child resulting in his
death three days later. The administrator of the child's estate sought
damages for breach of an implied warranty of merchantability
against the retailer, wholesaler-distributor and manufacturer of the
product. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, limiting liability to
the retailer, held that the administrator could bring an action against
the seller notwithstanding decedent's lack of privity of contract.
Miller v Preitz, 221 A.2d 320 (Pa. 1966)
The majority opinion was based upon theUniform Commercial
Code, Section 2-318, which provides:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to
any natural person who is in the family or household of
his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reason-
able to expect that such a person may use, consume or be
affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach
of the warranty *1
Under the court's interpretation of this section, the deceased nephew
was in the buyer's "family," and, further, the section could not
be construed to maintain an action m assumpsit against remote
sellers. Dissenting opinions attacked both the fictional approach to
the inclusion of the decedent within the buyer's family and the
inequitable placement of liability The dissenters contended that
the majority opinion ignored comment three of Section 2-318 which
stated:
1. 12A PA. STAT. ANN. § 2-318 (195S).
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This section expressly includes as beneficiaries within its
provisions the family household, and guests of the purchaser
Beyond this, the section is neutral and is not intended to
enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether the
seller's warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend
to other persons in the distributive chain.
2
The minority suggested adoption of the Restatement position s
which eliminated both privity of contract and negligence as essential
conditions to recovery
In a second case,4 decided the same day, in the same court,
the injured party sought damages against the manufacturer in a
trespass action. Rather than basing recovery upon the warranty or
trespass theories, the Restatement view5 was adopted.
Prior to the two cases mentioned, Pennsylvania's general rule
held that privity was required in assumpsit actions arising from
a breach of warranty in the field of products liability 6 Recognized
exceptions were injuries resulting from food products for human
consumption,7 and representations of quality or fitness for parti-
cular use conveyed by the manufacturer.8 Other recoveries were
granted contrary to the general rule,9 where advertisements ex-
tolled a product1 0 and where a product did not meet standard
demands. 1 At the time the instant case was to be decided, Penn-
sylvania had three alternatives on which to base future decisions
involving privity" they could have retained their general concept
of privity in assumpsit actions; they could have abolished the de-
fense of lack of privity; finally, they could have eliminated both
the privity of contract and negligence theories by encompassing
2. 12A PA. STAT. ANN. § 2-318 Comment 3 (1958).
3. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), TORTS, § 402A (1964)
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property, is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) It Is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
4. Webb v. Zern, 220 A.2d 853 (Pa. 1966). Plaintiff was allowed recovery against the
brewer and manufacturer of a (beer keg, purchased by the plaintiff's father and tapped by
plaintiff's brother, which exploded causing severe injuries to tihe plaintiff.
5. Supra note 3.
6. Barnard v. Pennsylvania Range Boiler Co. 216 F.Supp. 560 (D.C. Pa. 1963), Hoch-
gertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963).
7. Bilk v. Abbotts Dairies, Inc., 147 Pa. Super. 39, 23 A.2d 342 (1941), Nock v. Coca
Cola Bottling Works, 102 Pa. Super. 515, 156 AtL 5837 (1931).
8. Silverman v. Samuel Mallinger Co., 375 Pa. 422, 100 A.2d 715 (1953).
9. Supra note 6.
10. Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A-2d 568 (1959) (dictum) Knapp
V. Willys Ardmore, Inc., 174 Pa. Super. 90, 93, 100 A.2d 105, 107 (1953).
11. Mannsz v. MacWhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3rd Cir. 1946).
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both under an independent theory of strict product liability as
recommended by the Restatement of Torts. The Miller case indi-
cated the court would maintain the privity requirement as found in
the Uniform Commercial Code, however, Webb v Zer 12 adopted
the Restatement view as explained in the third alternative. By mtro-
ducing this standard, Pennsylvania seems to have taken the most
realistic approach to the practical needs of consumers in today's
complex society
Breach of warranty is a form of strict liability which originally
was an action on the case, sounding in tort. s The term "warranty"
as used in tort became erroneously attached to the law of contract
and subsequently was encumbered with such contractual burdens
as privity of contract 14 and the limitation of liability through the
use of contractual waivers and disclaimers of liability 15 These
burdens were relieved somewhat when third persons were allowed
recovery against manufacturers of "inherently dangerous" prod-
ucts. 16 Modern trends have indicated an even greater relaxation
of the restrictions placed upon the warranty theory Although a
great many states still require privity under the breach of war-
ranty theory, 17 some jurisdictions appear either to have abolished
the privity requirement"8 or to have reduced the requirement of
privity in accordance with the U.C.C., Section 2-318.19
A noticeable trend of the last two years has been abandonment
of both the contract and negligence theories and the adoption of
the Restatement theory 20 This view abandoned such legal obstacles
as requirement of privity in the warranty theory and proof of
negligence under the tort theory In their place, the plaintiff is
required to prove the product was defective when it left the manu-
12. Supra note 4.
13. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE
L. J. 1099, 1126 (1960).
14. Smith, Surviving Fictions I1, 27 YALE L. J. 317, 324 (1917).
15. Cf. Rasrnus v. A-O. Smith Corp., 158 F.Supp. 70 (D.C. Iowa 1958), Nelson v. Swed-
ish Hosp., 241 Minn. 551, 64 N.W.2d 38 (1954), Valley Refrigeration Co. v. Lange !Co., 242
Wis. 466, 8 N.W.2d 294 (1943).
16. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
17. Cf. Barnard v. Pennsylvania Range Boiler Co., Inc., supra note 6, Larson v. U.S.
Rubber Co., 163 F Supp. 327 (D.C. Mont. 1958), Long v. Flanigan Warehouse Co., 79
Nev. 241, 3,82 P.2d 399 (1963) , Whitehorn v. Nash Finch Co., 67 S.D. 465, 293 N.W 859
(1940), Cohan v. Associated Fur Farms, 261 Wis. 584, 53 N.W.2d 788 (1952).
18. Of. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th. Cir. 1959) (Kan. Law)
Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 290, 216 A.2d 189 (1965), Berstein v. Lily-Tulip Cup
Corp., 181 So.2d 641 (Fla. 1966), State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc.,
252 Iowa 1289, 110 N.W.2d 449 (1961), Wilson v. Modern Mobile Homes, Inc., 376 Mich.
342, 137 N.W.2d 144 (1965).
19. Henry v. John W Eschelman & Sons, 209 A.2d 51 (R.I. 1965) (But § 2-318 is to
be strictly construed) , VA. CODE ANx. § 8-654.4 (Supp. 1966).
20. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 I1.2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965) Dealers Trans-
port Co. V. Battery Distrib. Co., 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1966) Ford Motor Co. v. Lonan, 398
S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1966), Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 406 S.W.2d 488 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1966).
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facturer ' and to relate the defectiveness to his injury 22 A few
states have specifically adopted the Restatement view23 while others
have strongly indicated such intentions. 24
States bordering North Dakota have varied approaches to the
privity requirement. Montana law favors use of the negligence
theory but adheres to the requirement of privity in breach of war-
ranty actions.2 5 South Dakota law requires privity in breach of
implied warranty actions but tends to overlook this requirement
where warranties are expressed through advertisements.26  The
Minnesota Supreme Court strongly indicated its desire to abolish
the requirement of prvity when it stated:
It may well be that the time has come when we should
discard the whole troublesome idea that privity of contract
is essential to recovery on an implied warranty and extend
liability to the one who has caused the harm.2 7
North Dakota also strongly indicated that privity of contract
is no obstacle in breach of warranty cases.2 s The state's first case
in point29 allowed the purchaser of a defective truck recovery
against the manufacturer As the court had no North Dakota prece-
dent, the case was based upon a recent Michigan decision. 0 North
Dakota's most recent decision 31 granted recovery against a manu-
facturer for injuries sustained from the use of a defective drug
under both the theory of warranty and negligence. Although suf-
ficient evidence was submitted under these theories, the court felt
the Restatement view was important enough to be submitted as
follows:
It is believed, however, that strict liability in tort is for
the most part no different than strict liability in warranty,
that similar results can be achieved under either theory.
Comment m to § 402A of the Restatement of Torts seems to
agree. It states:
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS, 8 402A, comment g at 351 (1964).
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS, § 402A (1964).
23. Supra note 20.
24. Cf. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod. Co., 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d
897 (1963) Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965) , Goldberg v.
Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963), Lonz-
rick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St.2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966), Wrights v. Staff
Jennings, Inc., 405 P.2d 624 (Ore. 1965).
25. Larson v. U.S. Rubber Co., supra note 17.
26. Torpey v. Red Owl Stores, 129 F.Supp. 404 (D.C. Minn. 1955) (South Dakota
Law) Whitehorn v. Nash Finch Co., supra note 17.
27. Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543, 99 N.W.2d 670, 682 (1959).
28. Stromsodt v. Parke-Davis & Co., 257 F.Supp. 991 (D.C.N.D. 1966) (appeal pending),
29. Lang v. General Motors Corp., supra note 28.
Lang v. General Motors, 136 N.W.2d 805 (N.D. 1965).
30. Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90, N.W.2d
873 (1958).
31. Stromsodt v. Parke-Davis & Co., supra note 28.
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'There is nothing in this section which would prevent any
court from treating the rule stated as a matter of "war-
ranty" to the user or consumer '
But in the next sentence it points out that,
'if this is done, it should be recognized and understood
that the "warranty" is a very different kind of warranty
from those usually found in the sale of goods and that
it is not subject to the various contract rules which have
grown up to surround such sales.'3
2
Because of the two earlier decisions, North Dakota appears
to be confronted with the same alternatives as was Pennsylvania
prior to their most recent decision.3,3 Earlier state cases, public
policy, and the latest trend indicate that future litigation in North
Dakota is likely to adopt the Restatement view as did Pennsylvania.
A possible criticism of the Restatement approach is that such
a holding places an unfair burden upon the manufacturer. This
approach does not place liability without fault since the plaintiff
is still required to prove a defect in the product as well as to show
a causal connection between the defect and the injury 3 Placing
a consumer, who has no adequate means of protecting himself, in
a position of uncertain recovery for injuries resulting from defective
products is a more dangerous proposition. A supplier should not
be permitted to avoid responsibility by saying that he has made
no contract with the consumer. Liability ought to be placed at the
source of the defect. That end can best be accomplished through
the adoption of the view recommended by the Restatement of
Torts (Second)
RONALD K. CARPENTER
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY TO TRESPASSING CHILDREN-The
plaintiff, a twelve-year-old boy, suffered personal injuries while
climbing on and jumping from a scaffold erected by the defendants
in connection with the construction of a new home. The district
court denied defendants' motion for a judgment notwithstanding
verdict. The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that under the
32. Stromsodt v. Parke-Davis & Co., supra note 28 at 997, quoted from 2 FRuMm-
FRrEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, Chap. 3, § 16A (4).
33. Webb v. Zern, 220 A.2d 853 (Pa. 1966).
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS, § 402A (1964).
